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CRIMINAL PUNISHMENTLEGAL AND
MORAL CONSIDERATIONS
S. OLEY CUTLER, S.J.*

A

is inexorably linked to a
consideration of moral and legal responsibility. To study the philosophical basis for punishment is itself to investigate also the very foundations of our criminal law. For many years now the focus of attention
of students and observers of the interrelationship between psychiatry
and the law has been fixed on criminal responsibility, "insanity" rules,
and the like. The present preoccupation of such scholars seems to be
to accelerate the movement of fundamental changes in our handling of
the convicted criminal and to involve both an elimination of punishment from the administration of justice and a denial of the state's right
to punish the criminal at all. This discussion has now entered a public
phase outside the learned journals.' Much of this discussion concerns
itself with practical considerations of what best to do with the convicted
criminal, and not with the basic legal and moral points Which are really
involved. So it is that in this article we prepare to deal with these
fundamental considerations, leaving the technical aspects of criminal
punishment to those more qualified to discuss them.
Y DISCUSSION OF CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT

The Death Penalty
In the forefront of any discussion, legal or moral, on the entire,
broad topic of punishment, must come a consideration of capital punishment. We have come a long way from the day when the proposition:
"Capital Punishment Should Be Abolished" was a standard topic in
every college and prep school debate manual. Everywhere the issue is
now seriously debated, in state legislatures, legal associations, and in
popular journals of opinion. The Caryl Chessman case has undoubtedly
brought the issue to dramatic public attention.
*A.B. (1946), M.A. (1948), Boston College; LL.B. (1952), Georgetown University. Assistant Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.
1 See MARTIN, BREAK DowN THE WALLS (1954).

CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT

A key as to why the death penalty is
presently and has been so deeply embedded
in our legal systems is to be found in history
itself. We know, for example, from the research of anthropologists and students of
primitive peoples the blood-feud loomed
large as the vengeful response of a clan for
a homicide visited upon one of its members.
As primitive social organization progressed
along tribal governmental lines, the evidence indicates that the new tribal chief or
authority imposed most harsh expedients to
wipe out the corrosive effects of the bloodfeud practice upon tribal survival.
As one great authority on primitive law
states 2 :
What emerges from the data is this: within
loosely organized tribes in which the local
group is autonomous, trouble involving
members of different local groups frequently
brews physical violence which then leads to
feuding; feud marks an absence of law, for
the killing is not actually acknowledged as
a privilege-right; yet it appears that every
society has some set procedure for avoiding
feud and bringing it to a halt; among the
more organized tribes on the higher levels
of economic and cultural growth feud is
frequently prohibited.by the action of a
central authority representing the total social interest; this never happens on the lower
3
levels of culture.
Sanctions in society develop in legal systems, it appears, just as the culture and degree of civilization of the social group itself
progresses. As Hoebel further states:
As the scope of commonality expands, as
community of interest reaches out beyond
the clan and self-conscious kindred, men find
the means to create and implement judicial
and executive power in such a way that internecine strife within the bounds of the

larger society is checked and ultimately
4
suppressed.
So, it seems, capital punishment was
born as a harsh and stringent weapon of
social development. The context within
which this occurs is very important to keep
in mind when discussing the use of the
death penalty in modern times. Looting
amid a great general catastrophe, treason,
etc., during times of war, outbreaks of
large-scale crime in an underdeveloped regime - all these represent situations when
society, least able to protect its own citizens,
is most like a primitive society. The trend
in law within a progressing civilization ever
seems to have been to soften the harshness
of penal sanctions and to achieve the same
effects by gentler and more humane means.
Or, as one scholar sums up this general historical development of which we have been
speaking:
Among the most primitive societies, with
whose birth law came into existence, it was
penal law, and not compensatory (tort) law
which originated with punishment for certain primeval crimes; but it was criminal
justice that originated with the reaction to
other wrongs, in the form of blood vengeance, in form controlled by instinctive
feelings for "justness" and "fairness."
The law of compensation for harm done
came much later, in lieu of some of the
permissible vengeance reactions, and it
existed side by side with both genuine punishment and with remaining vengeance reactions, until it finally replaced all vengeance
reactions at a certain point of cultural de5
velopment.
Haven't we, then, at our present-day level
of social progress and civilization arrived at
the point where to retain capital punishment any longer as a part of our system of
4 Ibid.

2 HOEBEL, THE LAW OF PRIMITIVE MAN (1954).
• hI. at 330.

5 Mueller, Tort, Crime and the Primitive, 46 J.
CRIM. L., C. & P. S. 303, 323 (1955).
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justice would seem to be as obsolete as
using galleys, torture or branding? This
seems to be the inescapable conclusion if
we can be sure that a number of facts on
contemporary crime are true. Firstly, capital punishment was initiated and retained
through the years on the theory that it was
an essential means of protecting the security of society. And, I think, history could
prove that it did serve just such a purpose.
The sight of the executed or the gallows at
the edge of old cities and towns was a
stern reminder to the stranger that law was
here, at least, enforced. Is society today so
protected by the retention any longer of
the death penalty? To put our question in
another way, are potential wrongdoers
thereby deterred from serious capital offenses? This is a difficult question, and
well-nigh impossible to answer accurately.
Certain statistics must first be reviewed.
Five of our states have abolished capital
punishment. 6 The range of crimes punishable by death in the various states run from
thirteen offenses in Alabama (including dynamiting and train robbery) to only one in
five states (usually, murder).
The protection argument in favor of capital punishment assumes that abolition
would encourage criminal elements to increase the practice of carrying lethal weapons and even to use them if in danger of
being caught by the police. This is a very
important consideration, for the lives and
safety of society's protectors, the police,
6 Alaska, Delaware, Maine, Minnesota, Wisconsin.
In Michigan it is retained as a penalty only for
treason; in Rhode Island, only for murder committed in prison by an inmate serving life for
murder. Similarly, North Dakota retains it for
treason and for the Rhode Island type of situation; Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands alsohave abolished the death penalty. See Sellin, The
Death Penalty, MODEL PENAL CODE (Tent. Draft
No. 9, 1959).
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are involved. Several studies have been
recently made on the precise point of police
safety. Last year Mr. Thorsten Sellin published a study on the death penalty for the
American Law Institute. 7 He acknowledges
the difficulty involved in attempting to measure police safety from available data.
Nevertheless, upon studying reports for
rates of police killed while on duty in both
capital punishment and abolition states,
Professor Sellin concluded:
In the group of cities with populations between 30,000 and 60,000, the abolition cities
had a total rate (i.e. police homicides per
cent of population) of 1.0 and the capital
punishment cities 1.1, but there were considerable variations among the states ranging from a high of 4.1 in Indiana to a low
of .4 for Massachusetts. . . . It is obvious
from an inspection of the data that it is impossible to conclude that the states which
had no death penalty made the policeman's
lot more hazardous. It is also obvious that
the same differences observable in the general homicide rates of the various states
were reflected in the rate of police killings.8
Akin to the protective aspect of the death
penalty is a consideration of its deterrent
side. "Deterrence" has been defined as "the
preventive effect which actual or threatened
punishment of offenders has upon potential
offenders." 9 From a thoughtful consideration of this definition alone, I believe it is
immediately evident how difficult it would
be to attempt to measure the degree to
which the deterrent aspect of the death penalty is effective.
7 MODEL PENAL CODE (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).

8 Id. at 57. For a similar study of state police
safety, see Proceedings of Joint Committee of
Commons and Senate on Capital and Corporal
Punishment, 22D PARL., App. F (1955) (Can.)

(report of Donald Campion, S.J.).
9 Ball, The Deterrence Concept in Criminology
and Law, 46 J. CRIM. L., C. & P. S. 347 (1955).
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A recent writer on this subject declares
that an endeavor to measure the deterrence
factor of a particular type of punishment
involves at least six empirical variables.
These are:
(1) the social structure and value system
under consideration, (2) the particular population in question, (3) the type of law
being upheld, (4) the form and magnitude
of the prescribed penalty, (5) the certainty
of apprehension and punishment, and (6)
the individual's knowledge of the law as
well as the prescribed punishment, and his
definition of his situation relative to these
factors.' 0
The social scientist just quoted is so wary
about reaching a definitive conclusion as
regards the deterrent effect of the death
penalty that he feels forced to say:
S.. that capital punishment has been effective as a deterrent measure in numerous
historical periods under various political
circumstances is an established fact. (See
TARDE ...
[PENAL PHILOSOPHY] Chapter IX
"The Death Penalty.") That it has been
ineffective under certain conditions is also
established."

He continues:
To recapitulate, it may be said that current empirical data is inconclusive with regard to the deterrent effect of capital
punishment. It has been shown, however,
that the death penalty can be an effective
deterrent under certain conditions. It has
been noted that the categorical acceptance
or rejection of the death penalty as a deterrent is a meaningless position. Relevant
variables must be identified, measured, and
related to an analytical schema. Only then
will data be secured which can meet the
criteria of scientific knowledge. 12
Since the evidence of the deterrence
aspect of the death penalty is so unreliable,
1o Id. at 348.
11 Id. at 353 n. 24.
12 Id. at 354.

more compelling reasons for its abolition
must be present to justify the state's assuming the risk of a dangerous socio-legal experiment. It is unfortunate that more decisive evidence is not available as to the
deterrent effect of life imprisonment, which
is usually advanced as the acceptable alternative for the death penalty, in terms of
society's protection.13
Such compelling reasons as just alluded
to, do, I believe, really exist. The value
of one human life is so great that the state
should not be allowed to make the unredeemable error of injustice, executing the
wrong individual. Likewise, the agonizing
jury function, deciding a capital verdict,
will be considerably lessened with the abolition of the death penalty, and fewer sentimental verdicts will result. In fine, true justice will more surely ensue.
Movements today, especially among judicial conferences, to amend at least mandatory death sentence statutes; the consideration of more mitigating factors during
the sentencing procedure, as suggested by
the American Law Institute's Model Penal
Code; the reduction in the number of capital crimes - all these could do much to alleviate the awesome burden of our present
capital punishment situation. It is along
lines of practical considerations such as
these that I believe the death penalty controversy should be decided. Frequently, the
advocates of reform in this area of our
criminal law are in fact opposed to the
death penalty mainly because they are in
opposition to any crime-punishment relationship whatsoever. To clarify this debate
on the fundamental philosophy of criminal
punishment, I now turn to a consideration
13 See Sellin, Is Imprisonment for Life an Inadequate Substitute?, MODEL PENAL CODE 69 (Tent.
Draft No. 9,1959).
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of the basic philosophy that underlies any
form of punishment at all.
Reasons for Criminal Punishment
It was Mr. Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., who in his Common Law gave
wide circulation to the view that revenge
rests at the wellsprings of our entire system of criminal jurisprudence. 14 This opinion has been accepted uncritically by many.
So it:
was that the late Dr. Gregory Zilboorg
could say:
The impulse to take revenge, the talion principle regardless of what its manifestation in
the law may be, is still the preponderant
principle of our penal system.' 5
While the long history of mankind reveals countless examples of society's cruel
inhumanity to wrongdoers (everything from
hideous tortures and barbarous executions,
even to wild, lawless mob lynchings in our
own day), still I believe it to be a gratuitous assumption to say our entire system of
criminal sanctions reveals a cry for blood,
a basic urge to punish for its own sake. Such
an urge has been described in this fashion:
[O]n the one hand we identify ourselves with
the criminal's own impulses, and consequently we are tempted to give vent to these
impulses within us which are usually inhibited. This state of temptation produces
anxiety unless it is lived out in some innocent way such as the reading of detective
stories and murder mysteries. Our anxiety
can be quieted down only in one of two
ways: in our sudden unconscious denial of
any similarity with the criminal, we can hurl
ourselves upon him with all the power of
our aggressive, punitive, destructive hostility; or we can assume the criminal to be a
mentally sick man and can then assume a
14HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, Lectures I, I1
(1951).
15 ZILBOORG, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL

ACT AND PUNISHMENT 85 (1954).
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attitude

It is true, of course, that at the outbreak
of an especially brutal crime there is a reaction of convulsive horror in the community
where the crime occurred, particularly if it
be a small, closed-type community. Dr. Zilboorg's analysis of punishment just quoted
finds its echo in most classical commentaries on crime and punishment as well.
Thus, Salmond remarks in speaking of
retributive punishment:
It gratifies the instinct of revenge or retaliation, which exists not merely in the individual wronged, but also by way of sympathetic
extension in the society at large. Although
the system of private revenge has been suppressed, the emotions and instincts that lay
at the root of it are still extant in human
nature, and it is a distinct though subordinate function of criminal justice to afford
them their legitimate satisfaction. . . .The
emotion of retributive indignation, both in
its self-regarding and its sympathetic forms,
is even yet the mainspring of the criminal
law.17
These ordinary instincts, of course, are
experienced by individual and community
alike. It is the achievement of social order
through law that bespeaks the triumph of
civilized intelligence over such emotions.
There is no reason to conclude, as does
Holmes, for example, that because of the
substitution of law with its sanctions in
place of mob violence, our law itself is nothing but an emotive outburst, a pompous,
stilted legal fiction for what is still but a cry
for blood.' 8
Because of views such as these, shared
by many, it becomes most important, I
16 Id. at 79-80.
JURISPRUDENCE 146-47 (9th ed.
1936).
18 "If I do live with others they tell me that I must
do and abstain from doing various things or they
17 SALMOND,
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think, to attempt to answer several questions at this point in our article: does the
state really possess a moral right to punish
at all, and if so, why, and to what extent?

be the benefit of the criminal or of civil society; but it must at all times be inflicted on
him, for no other reason than that he has
committed a crime. A man can never be
treated simply as a means for realizing the
views of another man, and so be confused
with the objects of the law.of property.
Against that his inborn personality defends
him .... The penal law is a categorical imperative, and woe to him who creeps
through the serpentine ways of utilitarianism
to discover some advantage that may discharge him from the justice of punishment,
or even from the due measure thereof
.... That is the maxim of the Pharisees, "it
is expedient that one man should die for the
people, and that the whole nation perish
not." But if justice perish, then it is no more
worthwhile that man should live on the
earth. . . . It is only the right of requital
(jus talionis) that can fix the amount and
the quality of punishment. . . . Even if a
civil society were to dissolve itself by vote,
nevertheless, before it goes, the last murderer in prison must be executed. And this
that every man may receive the just due of
his deeds, and the guilt of blood not rest
upon a people which has failed to exact the
penalty. 19

Classical Theories On The State's
Right To Punish The Criminal
a. The Strict Retributionist Theory
There are in general four main theories
on the basis of state punishment of criminals. They are roughly classified as the
extreme retributionist, the deterrent and
medicfial views, and finally, the juridical
retribution theory. The deficiencies of the
first three have long since been pointed out
by the better texts on scholastic ethics.
Yet, it is still necessary to view each of these
opinions in turn, because kindred forms of
these theories have risen and still persist in
contemporary discussions on the question.
The extreme retributionist view is certainly not in great vogue today, but since it
possesses superficial resemblances to our
own solution of juridical retribution, it will
be well to analyze the theory briefly.
According to the extreme retributionist
theory, the purpose of punishment that has
been inflicted is to exact retribution in
whole or in part for the theological guilt
implied in the commission of a crime. The
originator and chief exponent of this view
was Emmanuel Kant, who can speak best
for himself:
Juridical punishment can never be inflicted
simply and solely as a means of forwarding
a good other than itself, whether that good
will put the screws on to me. I believe that they
will, and being of the same mind as to their conduct I not only accept the rules but come in time
to accept them with sympathy and emotional affirmation and begin to talk about duties and
rights." Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REv.
40,42 (1918).

This is the famous Kantian passage on
retributive punishment. Underlying it is the
author's philosophy both of the purpose of
the state and the ethical purposes of man.
The right to punish, we notice, is stated as
a categorical imperative, product of the
practical reason, which in his metaphysic
neither demands nor is capable of proof.
As to the extent and the quality of punishment to be meted out to the criminal,
Kant lays down a more ferocious norm; "it
is only the right of requital (jus talionis)
that can fix the quantity and quality of
punishment."
It is this theory of retributionism that is
intended when writers on criminological
1

OKANT,

PHILOSOPHY OF LAW

transl. 1887).

194-96 (Hastie

6

CATHOLIC LAWYER, SPRING

1960

problems speak of "revenge theories", etc.
Its own philosophical vacuity is enough to
damn it.

ishment gives no less importance to the
function of protection, stressed today, 21but
it goes more to the heart of the matter.

There is an Hegelian theory on the problem of state punishment also. As might be
anticipated, Hegel equates crime with negation, and punishment with the negation of
the prior negation, to effect an harmonious
synthesis. Against his theory, equally valid
are the arguments summoned against his
dialectical materialism.

Actually of course it seems slightly inaccurate to identify the preventive theory
with the -deterrent one. We do here, because in fact both theories do stress the
same finality. The deterrent view seeks to
hold up the punished criminal as an example to others in order to make them less
inclined to pursue a career of crime. It
is embodied in the adage, "Crime doesn't
pay." The preventive the'ory also seeks to
prevent future crime by means of punishment, but from the more proximate purpose of protecting society from attacks
made on its peace and security by the
criminal.
In a comprehensive survey and study of
all these theories of punishment, Fr.
Michael J. Mooney defines the deterrent
theory so as to show how it and the preventive theory tend to coalesce:

We mention Hegel only to draw attention to a kindred view of a professional
criminologist, the famous Pessina, who
holds that the basis of state punishment is
judicial necessity. For all purposes, he
merely states an opinion, while offering no
proof whatsoever. Pessina, in Hegelian
fashion, speaks of the necessity through
punishment of the reaffirmation of a violated legal norm.
b. The Deterrent Theory
So much then, for the strict retributionist school of criminal punishment. The
second and perhaps most widely held popular theory is the deterrent one. Holmes
speaks of this preventive or deterrent view
as that most commonly held in the English
speaking world of his day. 20 This is still
true among laymen to the law and citizens
in general. In his book on this problem,
already referred to, Dr. Zilboorg devotes
an entire chapter to a refutation of this
theory. Even the late Holy Father, in his
allocution to the International Penal Law
Congress in Rome, has his own reservations on this view, when he says:
This more profound understanding of pun20

HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 41 n. 2 (1946),

citing

STEPHEN,

GENERAL VIEW OF THE CRIMI-

NAL LAW OF ENGLAND

99.

[T]he deterrent theory [is] that which justifies punishment as a useful or necessary
instrument in the hands of society, whereby
society defends itself against those who
22
threaten its interest in any way.

The famous criminologist Lombroso is
often identified with the deterrent school.
This is true enough, but, as with Linstz
and many others, his main interest is more
concerned with the etiology of crime itself.
He favored an anthropological approach,
basing crime on inherited, atavistic forces
in the human personality, elements which
of course put the criminal's wrongful acts
beyond the latter's control. Such a deterministic approach to the causes of crime
21 Pius XtI, Allocution to the InternationalPenal
Law Congress, in 52 CATHOLIC MIND 118 (1954).
22. Mooney, The Morality of State-Punishmnent Medicinal.and Deterrent Theories, 61 IRISH ECCL.

kEc. 104, 109 (1943).
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was very popular in continental thinking
during the last half of the last century.
Just as often, however, the causes of crime
were linked to environment, as sociological
speculation on the problem developed. A
leading advocate of the deterrency school
of this latter stamp was the Englishman,
Jeremy Bentham. A recent writer sums up
Bentham's position:
[He insisted] that the function of law should
not be to achieve vengeance. . . but to pre23
vent the commission of the act.

Bentham stated that the purpose of
society is completely eudaemonistic, that
crime is the negation of this purpose and
so has to be prevented by social control.
The same writer just referred to characterizes Bentham's position on punishment
in this fashion:
Bentham advocated social engineering primarily in the realm of political sanctions
since this is the most malleable area in the
pleasure-pain equation. He dismissed any
idea of recourse to traditional or natural law
("nonsense on stilts" he caustically labelled
the latter).24

In evaluating Bentham's
same writer observes:

theory, the

Punishment is considered an evil, but a
necessary evil to prevent greater evils being
inflicted on the society and thus diminishing happiness. Bentham presumably does
not consider the possibility that an outlawed
act might actually serve to increase human
happiness; the dilemma so brilliantly portrayed by Dostoyevsky in Crime and Punishment in which a murder is defined, with
considerable justification, as a social good
Geis, Pioneers in Criminology, 43 J. CRIM. L.,
C. & P. S. 159, 165 n. 2 (1955). For a more comprehensive treatment of Bentham, see ROONEY,
23

LAWLESSNEss, LAW AND SANCTION 90 (1937).
24

Geis, supra note 23, at 165.

by Its perpetrator and thus morally justi25
fiable.
The greatest indictment against the deterrent theory is that it simply does not
hold up in practice. Threats of punishment
on the law books do not deter the very
many individuals who commit crimes anew
every day. This is the consensus of the
forty-eight state governors of the United
States with regard to the deterrent aspect
of the death penalty, as revealed in a poll
conducted

by

the

New

York

Herald

Tribune and published in a feature in July,
1954.26 Despite its undoubted value as a
deterrent to crime, capital punishment
simply cannot supply us with the fundamental justification of the state's right to
punish the criminal.
c.

The Rehabilitation Theory

The third of the traditional theories on
the basis of state punishment is that of the
rehabilitation, reformatory, or medicinal
theory. This view is the most commonly
held today by those most actively engaged
in the work of criminal law administration
and public order. Many testimonies from
contemporary sources serve to bear this
statement out. Thus, a report on parole
procedures states:
Since deterrence is at best a negative control, segregation effective only so long as it
continues, and retribution merely retaliatory
rather than corrective in aim, penological
experts now believe that treatment which
places primary emphasis upon reformation
renders maximum service to the community.

27

It is this theory of punishment policy
Geis, supra note 23, at 166.
26 For a recent editorial treatment of this matter,
see N. Y. Herald Tribune, Apr. 25, 1960, p. 14
col.
1.
27
Comment, 53 YALE L. J. 773 (1944).
25
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that lies behind the advocacy and use of
the indeterminate sentence, probation and
parole procedures. In the opinion of many,
"reformation of the criminal" must be the
aim of punishment, otherwise sanctions
have no place in our legal system at all.
So, it is argued that due to the total ignorance on the part of our courts of the
psychology of the criminal act and its
punishment, the individual good of the
criminal is always neglected. The obvious
answer to this is that such an individualistic approach to the problems of law completely overlooks society's true function,
to implement and strengthen the common
good through law.
Under the impact of the prison reform
movements of the last century, the progressive revamping of the scope and techniques of our modern juvenile training
schools, and especially through the influence of psychiatry, the rehabilitationist
theory has gained considerable ground in
28
our day.
This theory, of course, considers what
is to be done with the convicted criminal,
and really tells us nothing concerning
why he should be punished in the first
place. Surely, the more efficient administration of our penal system with the rebuilding of men into good citizens both
makes sense as respects the criminal and
contributes to the common good of the
community upon his release. Here the
Church herself has long set civil society
a good example to be followed because,
in her Canon Law she carefully distinguishes between poenae vindicativae and
poenae medicinales, where the latter are
conceived to be suitable to work a change
for the better in the delinquent. As Father
Mooney, aptly declares on this point:
28

See

MARTIN, BREAK DOWN THE WALLS

(1954).
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If, then, the common temporal good of the
members is the limit of the State's authority, it follows that the State has no mission
to promote individual morality - its jurisdiction in the sphere of morality is limited
to creating conditions where morality is not
hindered but may progress unimpeded. We
fail to see, therefore, how it'can be said to
be a State duty to promote the morality of
individual criminals - to effect a real reformation of character. .

.

.[T]he State's au-

thority is bounded by the limits of the common good and is not intended directly or
immediately for the good of the individual.

29

So much for a philosophical rejection
of this rehabilitationalist theory as the
basis for the state's right to punish the
criminal. The theory has other defects.
There is the germane question of responsibility. Too frequently, the defenders of
this theory proceed on the assumption that
free choice in criminal situations is the
exception, and acts which are the product
of 'mental disease, are the rule. Even a
prominent American jurist recently wrote:
Freudianism has carried the banner of scientific determinism into the inner sanctum
of theology - the human soul. Darwin
placed the human animal in nature, and
Freud attempted to explain what occurred
inside this human animal. His success has
been substantial .... As a result, [speaking

of Freud's concept of unconscious motivation] an expanded category of disease has
supplemented or displaced the diminished
category of "evil." Evil is not a scientific
word. 3 0

Such is often the narrow clinical view
of the sociological, medical and welfare
practitioner. Many are the instances of
diminished responsibility, and for a great
variety of reasons, running the gamut from
29 Mooney, supra note 22, at 105-06.

'30 Bazelon, The A wesome Decision, Saturday Evening Post, Jan. 23, 1960, pp. 32, 56.
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blood chemistry, illiteracy, poverty and
feeblemindedness to subtle psychological
and environmental factors. There are a
thousand and one anomalies in the general
run of men. We also know by equally
strong evidence that from an abuse of their
precious gift of freedom men will conspire,
plan and execute atrocious thefts, senseless murders and other criminal excesses and all this for their own personal aggrandizement. In their attempt to find any
explanation for crime except free will, the
physical and social scientists can speculate
on criminal instincts, a crisis catalyst and
the like; yet they are unable to explain the
well organized crime syndicate for the
well-calculated, deliberate self-serving
criminal activity that it is.
Akin to the notion that the state's
primary duty is to best effectuate the
purposes of the common good, is a view
that in exclusively seeking rehabilitation
in the over-all social context, the state is
assuming a welfare responsibility that
greatly exceeds its capacity and competency. An article in a 1938 law review
points up this particular difficulty with an
exclusively rehabilitatory policy:

count for the deviational personalities and
behavior in question run the whole gamut
of human inequality and need. . . . Nor
would it be easy to justify a rehabilatory
policy toward criminals more generous than
whatever may be the prevailing policy with
respect to the other classes of unfortunates
31
at any given time.
It will probably be objected here that,
from a viewpoint of Christian charity,
social justice, etc., we should, as citizens,
assume this vast responsibility of helping
the weaker members of society to regain
their social well-being and to restore-them
as useful, healthy, contributing members
of the community. Of course this is true,
but our precise point here is that this
great objective, ideal and desirable as it
is, cannot stand on its own feet as the
ultimate basis for justifying the state's
punishment of the criminal.
Our approach up to now seems so
clearly negative with regard to the value
objectives pursued by many who are
working for social reform, that the question naturally arises: what seems to be the
true notion of the basis for state punishment of the criminal? To that specific
point, we now turn our attention.

The healthy penal adjustment . . . would

thus consist in professing policies looking
toward the rehabilitation of offenders, and
employing such professed policies as a
premise, only to the extent to which we may
be willing at the same time to assume collective responsibility for the welfare of that
whole segment of human subnormality,
wreckage and underprivilege, which we experience as crime or delinquency. Let us
make no mistake about this. Given such cultures as we know, the welfare in question
would have to include material as well as
spiritual elements. Any very extensive program of rehabilitation would require an
assumption of responsibility of a degree to
which our communities are unaccustomed.
For the strains and conditions which ac-

A Proposed Solution
The various traditional theories on the
basis for state punishment of the criminal
have now been considered and rejected
because of their insufficiency in providing
us with a solid, unassailable ground for
justifying criminal punishment. It remains,
therefore, to evolve a theory which rejects
the errors of the systems already reviewed
and retains their good points, while staying at the same time within the framework
31 Dession, Psychiatry and the Conditioning of
Criminal Justice, 47 YALE L. J. 319, 339-40
(1938).

6
demanded by the teaching of Catholic
moral theology and scholastic ethics.
It will be necessary first to apply the
solution of scholastic ethics to our problem. This will give us a solid rational basis
upon which to build the structure of our
ultimate explanation.
The state, as correct natural law philosophy teaches, exists to provide for and to
promote the common good of its members.
Intrinsic to the nature of lawful government is the power to make laws to govern,
guide, protect and provide for the peace
and prosperity of its citizens, which is the
common good of society in the concrete.
In order to make laws which can achieve
their desired purposes, the state must add
sanctions to these laws - the observance of

law must be honored and its breach must
be punished. All this is to say that the
power to punish is inherent in the state's
power to make laws. The one without the

other would be meaningless. In this connection, Father Mooney, in his article on
punishment, says:

Individuals are, however, often found to
violate the social order, to infringe on the

rights of society or of other individuals, and
in this way public security and peace which
the state is bound to maintain, is threatened.
The fact that there is an obligation in conscience to respect the juridical order is not
sufficient to prevent all violations. Hence,
if society's right to pass laws is not to be
vain or illusory, it must have some means,
consonant with individual liberty, of ensuring their observance. The universal means is

reward for observdnce and punishment for
non-observance.... Accordingly, when the
state in the interests of the common good,
enacts certain laws, it attaches certain
sanctions to the violation of those laws, and
threatens to punish those who refuse to
obey. Experience tells us that, in spite of

the threat, crimes are nevertheless committed, and thereupon the state proceeds to
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inflict the punishment it has threatened, not
merely as a deterent to the actual offender
32
. . but also as a deterrent to others.
As Messner correctly observes, in agreement with the majority of Catholic moralists who have given consideration to the
question:
This right [the right to punish] is rooted in
the state's fundamental function of safeguarding law and order in society in view
of the partial perversion of human nature;
punishment of anti-social behavior is an indispensable means for this end. Thus the
deterrence theory is given its proper place;
although the right to punish is grounded in
the state's fundamental function, it is also
intended as a deterrent to crime.

. .

. In

its execution, punishment serves to restore
the violated legal order, which is the highest good of the community. The so-called
vindication theory rightly emphasizes this,
but its attempt to justify the right to punish
by the purely retributive function of government is very inadequate; this justification
can be found only in the indispensability of
punishment for maintaining law and order.
The object of punishment is also the im33
provement of the criminal.
Where does the state obtain this terrible
power over the life and freedom of its
members? The problem has often been a
semantic one. Finality of state punishment
has frequently been designated by Catholic
theorists as expiation. This is theological
terminology in a most unfortunate context.
Expiation connotes a payment rendered a
superior through suffering. This raises the
question: must punishment involve suffering, pain? Saint Thomas answers this for
us when he says all true punishment is
such precisely because it is inflicted
against the will of the punished. Otherwise,
it would be a pleasure and no privation.
32 Mooney, supra note 22, at 167.
33 MESSNER, SOCIAL ETHICS 591-92 (1952).
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Yet this is not to say that punishment of
criminals must take on characteristics of
the savage brutality of an earlier age.
As we approach the nub of our solution,
several important principles must be kept
well in mind. First, state punishment can
only be rightfully inflicted by the public
authority itself, and only for a juridical
crime (peccatum juridicum, as it has sometimes been called). This juridical crime
has been aptly defined as "a deliberate
external violation of the juridical order of
society which undermines the confidence
the citizens should have in the ability of the
State to protect them."' 34 Such a crime of
its very nature implies an abuse of free
will, of personal responsibility, and as
such, demands punishment - the reaction
of lawful government to a citizen's free
act cannot then be considered unjust as
respects the criminal, or using him as a
means to the end of the common good, as
Kant, Holmes, and others have often
argued.
Note in our definition of the criminal
act, the peccatum juridicum, the emphasis
that has been placed on the external
aspects of a violation of law. All human
acts, of course, have an internal as well as
an external aspect to them. But the state
has competence to punish only the external
aspect of crime. This is a key point. Public
authority to govern is given to the state
only in the area of external activity. It is
not in the ambit of state competence to
make laws governing, as such, the inner
forum of conscience. That they do so in
some cases is a per accidens, but not a per
se effect of law. This is clear from what
Saint Thomas says on this point: "Consequently, in matters touching the internal
Collins, The Grounds and Purpose of State
Punishment, 19 IRIsH THEOLOGICAL Q. 359, 366
(1952).
34

movement of the will, man is not bound to
obey his fellow man, but God alone. ' 35 As
said previously, the power to punish follows upon the state's power to legislate. So,
when a legislator promulgates a law to be
obeyed, he commands its observance, but
not that it necessarily should be performed
in a virtuous way or with a virtuous
intention.
In the case of a juridical crime the state
punishes the criminal act as such and does
not [nor is it competent to] enter into the
question of theological fault. This is evident from experience, for the state cannot
competently investigate the inner forum of
conscience; and even if it were able to do
so, it should not, for this inner, sacred
area of a man's conscience is the province
of God alone. Grave faults in the interior
forum do indeed merit strict retribution
and in Catholic theology this means that
such a grave fault merits hell, where the
strict demands of divine justice are satisfied. These are considerations which the
strict retributionists of the Kantian school
overlooked.
For what then is the state seeking retribution when it punishes external violations
of law, these juridical crimes?
The abuse of free will in such crimes
calls, as we have shown, for punishment.
How much punishment is dependent upon
the amount of damage done for which
justice demands satisfaction. Every crime
does involve damage, and not just material
damage. There is also further damage
done, in the disturbance that is inflicted
upon the peace and good order of any
well-ordered community.
1I-Il, q. 104, art. 5. "In
his quae pertinent ad interiorem motum voluntatis,
homo non tenetur homini oboediri, sed solum
Deo. Tenetur homo oboediri homini in his quae
exterius per corpus sunt agenda." Ibid.
35 SUMMA THEOLOGICA

6
The relation between the freely placed
criminal act and the resultant damage done
to the community is sharply drawn in the
address of the late Holy Father, Pope Pius
XII, to the Congress of Italian Jurists:
Connected with the concept of the criminal
act is the concept that the author of the act
becomes deserving of punishment (reatus
poenae). The problem of punishment has
its beginning, in an individual case, at the
moment at which a man becomes a criminal.

The punishment is the reaction required by
law and justice to the crime: they are like
a blow and a counter-blow. The order violated by the criminal act demands the
restoration and re-establishment of the equilibrium which has been disturbed. It is the
proper task of law and justice to guard and
preserve the harmony between duty on the
one hand and the law, on the other, and to
re-establish the harmony if it has been in-

jured. The punishment in itself touches not
the criminal act but the author of it, his
person, his Ego, which with conscious determination has performed the criminal act.
Likewise the punishing does not proceed as
it were from an abstract juridical ordination,
but from the concrete person invested with
legitimate authority. As the criminal act, so
also the punishment opposes person to
36
person.
The remarks of the Holy Father in the
same pronouncement are equally illuminating on the justification of punishment as
the state's reaction to crime:
Considered in the object affected by it, the
criminal action is an arrogant contempt for
authority, which demands the orderly maintenance of what is right and good, and which
is the source, the guardian, the defender and
the vindicator of order itself.... The object

affected by this act is also the legally established community, if and in as faras it places

in danger and violates the order established
Address of His Holiness, Pope Pius XII, to
members of the Italian Association of Catholic
Jurists, December 5, 1954, in 53 CATHOLIC MIND
364,366 (1955).
36
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by the laws. Nevertheless not every true
criminal act as described above has the
character of a crime against the public law.
Public authority must be concerned only
with those criminal actions which injure the
orderly society as established by law. Hence
the rule concerning a juridical crime: no
37
crime where there is no law.

As indicated in the remarks of His
Holiness, as well as in our own explanation above of a "juridical crime", there is
in crime a loss of confidence on the part
of the citizenry in the state's ability to
maintain and protect basic social rights.
It is this unbalance in society that must
be righted. This is no vague, chimerical
thing, for such confidence is largely what
keeps any community going, be it large or
small. What the roots of this confidence
are, we shall presently describe. In inflicting punishment for crime, the state satisfies not Divine Justice, as we have indicated, but meets the demands of social
justice by restoring the shaken confidence
of the community in its law. It achieves
retribution for the violation of its own
juridical order. This is undoubtedly what
Saint Thomas means when he says of the
purpose of punishment, that it should be
in terms of common good that peace and
38
order be restored to the state.
This, briefly, is the theory of juridical
retribution, and in it retribution by the
state is indicated as the primary purpose
of punishment. As can easily be seen it
is an objective theory, based ultimately
on the true scholastic philosophy of the
purpose of the state itself.
Our answer to the main question of
the moral basis for state punishment of
the criminal has been in accord with the
37 Id. at 365-66.
38 SUMMA TiiEOLOGICA I-l1, q. 68, art. 1. "Bonum

rei publicae cujus quies procuratur per punitionem
peccantium." Ibid.
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theory of "juridical retribution." This
theory finds strong support with the leading canonists of this century. Thus, Wernz
speaks of the underlying purpose of criminal punishment as-.
The necessity either of preserving or pro39
tecting the public order of society itself.
and again,
So it happens that punishment held out as a
threat deters one from a violation of law,
and in this sense it is a legal sanction for it
staunches up the law itself, while at the
same time it protects and wards off the juridical order of society from threats to its
40
security.
The famous canonist Michiels 41 likewise
favors our theory and gives an even more
profound analysis than Wernz of its underlying principles. He views the theory as
bedded firmly on traditional natural law
philosophy. He outlines the development
of the theory in nine steps: (1) Society
must function securely in achieving its
purposes by having its members, created
beings, serve the eternal purpose of God,
their Creator. (2) They achieve this purpose by using the means consonant with
their created natures and (3) for humans
this involves a proper utilization of their
endowments of human intelligence and
personal freedom - a pursuance by man
of ethical purpose in the context of the
divinely ordained moral order. (4) From
the necessity of men conspiring prudently
together as social beings to form lawful
governments flows the realization in the
39 WERNZ, IUS DECRETALIuM
40 "Inde habet poena quad in

20 (2d ed. 1905).
statu comminationis
deteret a legis violatione, et in hoc sensu est sanetio legis, legem ipsam firinate et ordinem jurisdicum contra perturbationes tuetus et prategat."
Ibid.
41 MICHIELS,

(1943).
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concrete of our juridical order, (5) an
order which is at the same time a social
order (6-9). When man violates the juridical order, he of necessity, disrupts the
social order. This violates social justice
and results in injustice to the institution,
the state, whose purpose it is to protect the
rights of its members, as well as insuring
its own survival from attack. Hence, from
a divinely ordained plan assigning man's
place in the universe, punishment as a
necessary consequence of crime flows by
the sweet logic of Divine Providence.
Catholic moral theologians who treat the
problem of the moral basis of state punishment, following the lead of Saint
Thomas, 42 invariably defend the juridical
retribution theory on the basis of Saint
Paul's famous text in Romans 13 on civil
obedience to one's lawful rulers.
Beginning with chapter 12 of Romans,
Saint Paul develops the moral section of
the Epistle. In chapter 13 he exhorts the
new Christians to obey the civil authorities (and this at the time was the hated
and feared authority of the Roman
Empire). His basic reason for this obedience is "because there exists no authority
except from God, and those who rule have
been appointed by God. '43 In speaking of
crime and its punishment, Saint Paul says:
Do you wish, then, not to fear the authority?
Then do what is good and you will receive
praise for it .. .but if you do what is evil,
fear, for not without reason does it carry the
sword. For it is God's minister, an avenger
44
to execute wrath on him who does evil.

Saint Thomas' gloss on this text from
Romans is:
If, however, the avenger's intention be di42 SUMMA THEOLOGICA II-I,
43 Roinans 13: 1-2.
44 Id. at 2-5.

q. 108, art. 1 ad I.
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rected to some good, to be obtained by
means of punishment of the person who has
sinned (for instance that the sinner may
amend, or at least that he may be restrained
and others be not disturbed, that justice be
upheld . . .) then, vengeance may be lawful,
provided other due circumstances be ob45
served.
In his allocution to the Italian jurists in
1954 His Holiness, Pope Pius XII, sums
up the case for the juridical retribution
theory so well that it can serve too as a
conclusion of our discussion of the problem of state punishment. His Holiness
says:
What We said in Our discourse on international penal law on, Oct. 3, 1953, referring to the theory of retribution, is to the
point here. Many, though not all, reject vindictive punishment, even if it is proposed to
be accompanied by medicinal penalties. We
then declared that it would not be just to
reject completely, and as a matter of principle, the function of vindictive punishment.
As long as man is on earth, such punishment,
can and should help toward his definitive rehabilitation, provided man himself does not
raise barriers to its efficacy, which, indeed,
is in no way opposed to the righting and
restoring disturbed harmony, 'which, as We
have already pointed out, is an essential
46
element of punishment.
The law in setting down its penal sanctions makes an important distinction between the threat of punishment and the
execution of that threat in actual fact.
I-II, q. 108, art, 1, ad 1.
"Si vero intentio vindicates feratur principaliter ad
aliquod bonum, ad quod pervenitur per poenam
peccantis, puta ad . . . quietem aliorum et ad
justitiae conservationem . . . potest essevindicatio licita, alliis debitis circumstantiis servatis."
Ibid.
4( Address of His Holiness, Pope Pius XII, to
members of the Italian Association of Catholic
Jurists, December 5, 1954, in 53 CATHOLIC MIND
364, 369-70 (1955).
45 SUMMA THEOLOGICA
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We can in conclusion, at the end of our
investigation of the basic question proposed at the start of this paper, state that,
as Father Collins in his article on punishment puts it:
We conclude, therefore, that the primary
purpose of threatening punishment is to
deter people from breaking the law. When,
however, the law has been broken and the
threat of punishment has been carried into
effect, it does not lose its deterrent character but this ceases to be primary. The primary aim of punishment that has been inflicted is retributive in a juridical sense. It
is meant to undo as far as possible the social
effects of the external crime. Emendation of
the criminal is not the primary purpose of
State inflicted punishment. In fact, it may
not be compatible with the punishment that
the common good demands, as when the
common good demands the death penalty.
However, when it is compatible, it is an
object that is secondary and to be achieved
through the common good and in subordination to it. If this explanation be correct, it
is still true to say that punishment is only
inflicted for a peccatum, in the case of
State punishment, a peccatum juridicum. It
is also true to say that in punishing juridical
crimes the State uses delegated authority
and acts as God's viceregent in vindicating
47
the external order in civil society.
In our explanation of a valid philosophical position, we believe we have
achieved what we set out to accomplish,
namely, to discover the primary, moral
basis for state punishment, while giving
allowance for the best features of the
various traditional theories. In itself, the
juridical retribution theory is not a popular one. The reason for this is due mainly
to the desire of many would-be social
reformers to achieve their purposes with
47 Collins, The Grounds and Purpose of State
Punishment, IRISH THEOLOGICAL Q. 359, 368

(1952).

CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT

a program based on a Platonic "philosopher-king" concept. This tendency to
dominate and to fashion the state itself
into the vehicle of one's own prepossessions is one of the most dangerous variants
of totalitarianism to appear in democratic
society today. It must be the purpose of
the Catholic moralist, the Catholic lawyer,

as well as the Catholic worker in the broad
field of social welfare, constantly to urge,
direct and moderate well-intentioned
movements by the sagacity and fundamental truth of his own moral heritage.
To the perennial task of reasserting the
riches of that moral heritage, the foregoing
discussion has been directed.

CRIME AND PUNISHMENT

ing, morally and religiously purified, of
punishment, and, with the outpouring of
charitable assistance, may they help to
make smooth for the condemned prisoner
the way that must lead him to the longedfor liberation from guilt and punishment.

(Continued)
May these considerations of Ours contribute with the richness of Christian
thought toward illuminating the true mean-

